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UNITED STATES V. BROWN: IMPLEMENTING
MASSIAH
While participating in an attempted purchase of a diamond ring
with stolen Sears merchandise certificates, Mary Brown was appre-
hended by a security guard and charged with violations of state law.
Immediately prior to her preliminary hearing on these accusations,
while she was waiting to meet with her state-appointed public de-
fender, two agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation ap-
proached Brown, intending to inquire into the violations of federal
law resulting from the theft. Before questioning Brown, the agents
recited the Miranda rights and obtained from her a signed statement
that purported to waive all of the privileges identified in those warn-
ings, including her right to an attorney.' Although they assumed that
counsel had been appointed for Brown, the agents did not ask
specifically whether she desired to consult with her particular lawyer.
As a result of the agents' omission, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held in United States v. Brown 2 that the interrogation
had unconstitutionally denied Brown her sixth amendment right to
counsel 3 and that any evidence relating to it should have been ex-
1. Mary Brown received the following warnings:
Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights.
You have the right to remain silent.
Anything you say can be used against you in court.
You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask
you any questions and to have him with you during questioning.
If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before
any questioning if you wish.
If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present,
you will still have the right to stop answering at any time. You also
have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to a
lawyer.
United States v. Brown, 551 F.2d 639, 648 (5th Cir.), rehearing en bane granted,
558 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1977) (dissenting opinion). Brown signed the following
waiver:
I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my
rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions.
I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I
am doing. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pres-
sure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.
2. 551 F.2d 639 (5th Cir.), rehearing en bane granted, 558 F.2d 327 (5th Cir.
1977).
3. Id. at 643.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
eluded from her federal prosecution.4 Because the district court did
not suppress this evidence, the court of appeals reversed Brown's
federal conviction.5 The decision in Brown did not rely upon Miranda
v. Arizona,6 in which the Supreme Court held that the fifth amend-
ment right against self-incrimination required that all persons sub-
jected to a custodial interrogation be informed of their sixth. amend-
ment rights to consult with counsel and to have an attorney present
during questioning.7 Instead, the appellate court recognized that two
pre-Miranda decisions, Massiah v. United States s and Escobedo v.
Illinois,9 had determined that the sixth amendment required law en-
forcement officials to respect an attorney-client relationship estab-
lished prior to a police interrogation. 0 Arguably, the warnings out-
lined by the Court in Miranda, which were intended to protect a sus-
pect's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination, were in-
sufficient to safeguard the other constitutional rights of an indi-
vidual. In Brown the court stated that the FBI agents, in order to
effectuate Brown's sixth amendment right as anticipated in Massiah,
were required to use precautions beyond those listed in Miranda and
to inquire specifically whether Brown desired to consult with her
previously appointed counsel.".
Recently, in Brewer v. Williams,12 the Supreme Court has re-
affirmed the importance of the right to counsel in an attorney-client
relationship established prior to a suspect's interrogation. To some
extent, however, the breadth of this right depends on the required
procedures through which law enforcement officials implement it.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has identified neither the precise
contours of the sixth amendment guarantee nor the required proce-
4. Id. at 644.
5. Id. at 647.
6. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7. "[W]e hold that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly in-
formed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer
with him during interrogation . . . ." Id. at 471. See Spring, The Nebulous
Nexus: Escobedo, Miranda and the New 5th Amendment, 6 WASHBURN L.J. 428
(1967); Warden, Miranda-Some History, Some Observations, and Some Ques-
tions, 20 VAND. L. REV. 39 (1966); Comment, The New Definition: A Fifth
Amendment Right to Counsel, 14 U.C.L.A. REV. 604 (1967); Comment, The New
Right-Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel, 20 U. MIAMI L. REV. 893 (1966).
8. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
9. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
10. 551 F.2d at 642-44. See also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
11. 551 F.2d at 643. The dissent, in contrast, did not interpret Massiah as
requiring that warnings in addition to those enunciated in Miranda be given to
Brown before she could be interrogated. Id. at 648.
12. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
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dures through which the right may be exercised. This Comment out-
lines the right to counsel as articulated in Massiah and its progeny. It
then discusses both the propriety and effectiveness of the differing
implemental procedures recognized in the various state and federal
courts.
RECOGNITION OF THE MASSIAH RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In Massiah v. United States 13 the Supreme Court first recognized
that an interrogation of a defendant conducted without the presence
of his previously-retained attorney could constitute a violation of
the accused's sixth amendment right to counsel.". Massiah involved
the post-indictment, clandestine surveillance of the defendant after
he had retained an attorney.' 5 The Supreme Court held inadmissible
the resulting evidence,'1 6 stating that this extra-judicial "interroga-
tion" violated the defendant's right to counsel.' 7 Rejecting the
premise that the sixth amendment guarantee only provided an ac-
cused with the right to the assistance of an attorney at his trial, the
Court noted that such a restriction could deprive the defendant of
legal advice when he most needed it.18
One month after Massiah the Court in Escobedo v. Illinois 19 deter-
mined that the right to counsel attaches during the accusatory rather
than at the post-indictment stage of the legal proceedings. 20 This ex-
tension of the protection of the sixth amendment depended on two
interrelated factors: 21 the functional insignificance of a formal
13. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
14. Id. at 206.
15. While Massiah was free on bail and in a codefendant's car, he made in-
criminating statements, which were heard by a government agent who had
hidden a radio transmitter in the automobile. The Court characterized this sur-
veillance as an interrogation. Id. at 206.
16. Id. at 207.
17. Id. at 206.
18. Id. at 204.
19. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
20. Id. at 485. Justice White's dissent in Massiah predicted this extension:
The importance of the matter should not be underestimated, for
today's rule promises to have wide application well beyond the facts
of this case. The reason given for the result here-the admissions
were obtained in the absence of counsel-would seem equally perti-
nent to statements obtained at any time after the right to counsel
attaches, whether there has been an indictment or not; to admissions
made prior to arraignment, at least where the defendant has counsel
or asks for it ....
377 U.S. at 208 (White, J., dissenting).
21. 378 U.S. at 486-92.
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indictment and the importance and vulnerability of the fifth amend-
ment right against self-incrimination.
Discussing the first element, the Court emphasized the purpose of
the police interrogation. In Escobedo the police had ceased conducting
a general investigation of an unsolved crime and had begun seeking a
confession from a particular suspect. " 2 In effect, the suspect already
had been charged; to require the issuance of a formal indictment
before permitting him to consult with his attorney would exalt form
over substance and sanction a cynical manipulation of the formali-
ties.23 This analysis led the Court to view the "accusatory stage" of
the legal process as the time when the sixth amendment right to
counsel attaches. 24
The Court's definition of the accusatory stage emphasizes the sec-
ond crucial element in the Escobedo decision: protection of the guar-
antee against self-incrimination. The accusatory process begins "when
[the] focus [of the investigation] is on the accused and its purpose
is to elicit a confession." 25 Police efforts to evoke a confession
threaten a suspect's right against self-incrimination, and the Court
has recognized that an accused may need the advice of an attorney
before he can exercise his fifth amendment right intelligently.2 6 Thus,
a suspect may invoke the sixth amendment guarantee for the purpose
of protecting his other constitutional rights during the accusatory
process. 27
Despite its potentially broad impact, the holding in Escobedo was
based upon a particularly egregious factual situation. The subject of
22. Id. at 485.
23. Id. at 486, 488.
24. Id. at 492.
25..Id. Since Escobedo, courts have determined whether an accusatory stage
has been reached by considering a variety of factors, including the length, time,
and place of the interrogation; the type of questions asked; and the evidence
existing at the time of the inquiry. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Dickerson v.
Rundle, 238 F. Supp. 218 (E.D. Pa. 1965), aff'd, 363 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 916 (1967) (accusatory stage reached when questions at
defendant's interrogation concerned inconsistencies in statements he had made at
a preliminary hearing) ; People v. Sears, 62 Cal. 2d 737, 401 P.2d 938, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 330 (1965) (accusatory stage reached when defendant, following his arrest
but prior to his arraignment, was interrogated for 45 minutes after police already
had spoken with several witnesses) ; People v. Stewart, 62 Cal. 2d 571, 400 P.2d 97,
43 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1964), aff'd sub nom. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) (accusatory stage reached when defendant was interrogated daily for
the five days during which he was in custody).
26. 378 U.S. at 488.
27. See, e.g., Warden, supra note 7, at 44. See generally Comment, The Right
to Counsel During Police Interrogation: The Aftermath of Escobedo, 53 CALIF.
L. REv. 337 (1965).
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a murder investigation, Escobedo had requested permission to consult
with his previously-retained attorney throughout his interrogation.
Similarly, the suspect's lawyer repeatedly attempted to meet with
his client. Notwithstanding the unsuccessful attempts of the accused
and his attorney to confer, the police were unable to elicit inculpatory
statements from Escobedo until they exploited his ignorance of the
law and tricked him into incriminating himself.28
These circumstances invited narrow factual distinctions by courts
that later diminished the impact of Escobedo.2 9 Thus, when situations
involved more restrained police conduct than that in Escobedo, courts
tended to reach results differing from the latter case, noting a
defendant's failure to demand counsel 30 or narrowly delineating the
scope of the accusatory stage concept.3 ' Moreover, the defendant's
retention of an attorney prior to the extraction of incriminating
information in both Escobedo and Massiah distinguished those cases
from others in which a defendant did not obtain counsel.3 2
In 1966, however, the Court expanded the application of the prin-
ciples implicit in Escobedo, holding in Miranda v. Arizona 3 that a
suspect has the right to counsel throughout his custodial interroga-
tion, regardless of his prior retention of or request for an attorney.3 4
An accused must be advised expressly not only of this right but also
28. For a complete statement of the facts in Escobedo see 378 U.S. at 479-83.
29. See Browne v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491, 131 N.W.2d 169 (1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 1004 (1965) ; authorities cited at note 31 infra.
30. See, e.g., Browne v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491, 131 N.W.2d 169 (1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 1004 (1965) (defendant's failure to request attorney's presence
and counsel's failure to attempt a conference with defendant distinguish Esco-
bedo). But see People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169,
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 937, 946 (1965) (distinction of Escobedo on the basis of
defendant's failure to request counsel is an overly formalistic interpretation).
Note, Escobedo in the Courts: May Anything You Say Be Held Against You?,
19 RUTGERS L. REv. 111, 122-26 (1964). See generally, e.g., Comment, The Right
to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 25 MD. L. RLV. 165, 171-76 (1965).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Konigsberg, 336 F.2d 844 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 930, 933 (1964) (accusatory stage not reached when defendant volun-
tarily answered questions of a general nature while in custody); Commonwealth
v. Lepore, 349 Mass. 121, 207 N.E.2d 26 (1965) (accusatory stage not reached
when defendant, the day after arrest, answered investigatory questions at his
apartment). See generally Rothblatt, Police Interrogation and the Right to Coun-
sel, Post Escobedo v. Illinois: Application v. Emasculation, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 41
(1965).
32. See generally Note, The Coming of Massiah: A Demand for Absolute Right
to Counsel, 52 GEo. L.J. 825, 844-45 (1964).
33. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
34. Id. at 471. See note 7 supra & accompanying text.
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of his right to remain silent.3 5 Moreover, unless a suspect knowingly
and intelligently waives these rights, he may not be questioned. 36
The revolutionary potential of Miranda lay in its formulation of re-
quired police procedures through which a defendant's fifth amend-
ment right against self-incrimination could be protected. With its
sweeping pronouncements and encompassing effect, that case over-
shadowed Massiah and Escobedo. In Brewer v. Williams,37 however,
the Supreme Court recognized a vitality in Massiah that was inde-
pendent of the holding in Miranda. While transporting Williams, the
defendant in Brewer, from one city to another, a police officer per-
suaded him to reveal the location of his murder victim's body. Al-
though the defendant was given the Miranda warnings before the
trip began, the officer obtained no express waiver of these rights be-
fore he conducted his interrogation. Moreover, the detective ignored
the instructions of Williams's attorney to refrain from speaking
with the accused during the trip,38 and the officer continued to talk
to the defendant even after Williams had said that he would make
a statement regarding his involvement in the crime after conferring
with his attorney at the completion of the journey.39
Avoiding the issues of whether the defendant had been denied
his privilege against self-incrimination or whether the detective had
violated the requirements of Miranda during his interrogation of the
suspect, the Supreme Court reversed Williams's conviction because
the police officer failed to respect the accused's right to counsel. 4 The
detective's conduct, which prevented the defendant from exercising
his sixth amendment guarantee to consult with his previously-retained
attorney, therefore was proscribed by the Court's decision in
Massiah.41
Similarly, in Brown the Fifth Circuit invoked neither the fifth
amendment nor Miranda in reversing Brown's conviction. An asser-
tion of a defense based on a fifth amendment violation however, prob-
ably would have been unsuccessful. Brown had been given the warn-
ings required by Miranda on at least three occasions, the last immedi-
ately before the FBI interrogation, and had signed a document ex-
pressly waiving those rights.42 The role of the sixth amendment, on
35. 384 U.S. at 478-79.
36. Id. at 471, 479.
37. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
38. Id. at 391-92.
39. Id. at 392.
40. Id. at 397-98.
41. Id. at 400-01.
42. 551 F.2d at 642.
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the other hand, is clear in Brown. The Fifth Circuit refused to give
efficacy to the defendant's signed waiver, not because Brown had
been denied the Miranda warnings, a requirement that in fact had
been met, but because the defendant had not been asked whether she
wished to consult with the attorney appointed to represent her.43
Determining that the process already had shifted to an accusatory
stage before Brown's interrogation, 44 the court held that the agent's
failure to inquire whether the accused desired to confer with her
attorney prior to the questioning constituted a violation of the sixth
amendment.45
In Brown the Fifth Circuit delimited the sixth amendment right to
counsel that the Supreme Court identified in Massiah and extended
in Escobedo. Basically, the privilege entitles an individual who has
acquired an attorney to consult with that particular lawyer during
any police interrogation involving an investigation that has reached
the accusatory stage4 This guarantee is applicable only when the
police know or have reason to know that the accused individual has an
attorney.47 Although Brown's definition of the sixth amendment
right is within the scope of Supreme Court precedent, the court of
appeals also addressed the question of implementation of the privi-
lege, thereby confronting an issue not yet resolved by the Supreme
Court.
IMPLEMENTING THE MASSIAH RIGHT
To a certain extent, the breadth and the strength of the Massiah
right to counsel depend upon the procedures that the police must fol-
low to safeguard the constitutional guarantee. Subsequent to Massiah,
lower courts have adopted two approaches effecting the privilege.
Treating the right as absolute, one approach prohibits the interro-
gation of an accused unless either his attorney is present throughout
the questioning or the suspect affirmatively waives his Massiah privi-
lege in the presence of the lawyer.48 Under the second approach,
43. Id. at 643.
44. Id. Using the "focus on the accused" test of Escobedo, see note 25 supra &
accompanying text, the Fifth Circuit has construed broadly the term "accusatory
stage." See Clifton v. United States, 341 F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 1965).
45. 551 F.2d at 643.
46. Id.
47. Cf. id. at 642-44.
48. People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968).
See generally 20 BUFFALO L. REv. 704 (1971). In Arthur the court relied on the
New York Constitution and state precedent, not on the -sixth amendment and
Supreme Court precedent. New York Court of Appeals decisions have been cited
with approval, however, by the Supreme Court. See note 54 infra.
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courts view the constitutional guarantee as waivable: the police
may bypass the attorney and directly contact a suspect who then,
under appropriate circumstances, may relinquish his right to his
lawyer's presence.4 9
Jurisdictions adhering to the second method have adopted varia-
tions in the sufficiency of the warnings designed to inform suspects
of their right to counsel. In some areas, a suspect simply may be
given the Miranda warnings, the courts failing to distinguish be-
tween the Miranda and Massiah rights. 50 Alternatively, a court may
consider the Massiah right to be waivable but nevertheless may re-
quire the police to employ a distinct warning in addition to that re-
quired by Miranda. The Fifth Circuit endorsed the latter view in
Broum.5'
The Absolute Right Approach
The New York Court of Appeals, in People v. Arthur,52 adopted
an absolute approach to the Massiah right to counsel. The court
determined that under the New York Constitution 53 a suspect who
has an attorney, whether by appointment or personal retention, can-
not be interrogated unless he affirmatively waives his right to
counsel in the presence of his lawyer.5 4 This privilege, which man-
dates that counsel be notified and present at least at the inception
of any police interrogation, attaches as soon as the police know or
have reason to know that the suspect is legally represented. 5 In
effect, the absolute position proscribes the direct communication by
the police with a suspect who they are aware has an attorney; instead,
questions must be channeled through his lawyer.
49. See United States v. Brown, 551 F.2d 639, 643 (5th Cir. 1977); cf. Brewer
v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 402 (1977).
50. See, e.g., Reinke v. United States, 405 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1968) ; Coughlan
v. United States, 391 F.2d 371 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 870 (1968).
51. 551 F.2d at 643.
52. 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968).
53. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6, provides in pertinent part: "[I]n any trial in any
court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend ...
with counsel .... "
54. 22 N.Y.2d at 328-30, 239 N.E.2d at 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 666-67. The court
relied on its own precedents, the most important of which are People v. Donovan,
13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963) and People v. Water-
man, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961). Waterman is cited
with approval in Massiah, 377 U.S. at 205, and Donovan is quoted extensively
in Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 486-87.
55. 22 N.Y.2d at 329, 239 N.E.2d at 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 666. Therefore, the
right attaches whether the police are informed of the attorney-client relationship
by the suspect or his lawyer.
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Underlying the rationale of the absolute right is the implicit view
that all direct police-suspect contact violates the latter's constitutional
right to counsel.5 6 Generally, a police approach that bypasses the
attorney in favor of direct communication with a suspect denies that
individual the assistance of legal representation and may be con-
demned as governmental misconduct. 57 Misconduct was suggested in
Massiah from the tactics employed by the police. The interrogation, a
secret surveillance by the police that was engineered with the assist-
ance of a codefendant, elicited incriminating statements by an accused
who was unaware either that he was being overheard or that his con-
versation would be introduced as evidence in trial. Massia contrasts
with Brown, in which the police approached openly, identified them-
selves, and warned Brown of certain of her constitutional rights. The
implications of governmental misconduct in Brown, however, stem
from the timing of the interrogation, immediately before the defend-
ant's appointment with her attorney, and from the agent's assumption
that Brown had a lawyer.58
If a deliberate attempt to isolate a client from his attorney con-
stitutes police misconduct, then an investigating official's motive to
deny a suspect his lawyer's assistance can provide the basis to define
the actions that violate the sixth amendment. In classifying a specific
act as impermissible, a court could focus on whether governmental
efforts were designed to prevent client-attorney contact. This analysis
could equate the open police approach in Brown with the surreptitious
surveillance in Massiah: both cases involved deliberate governmental
actions that denied the suspect the advantage of consulting with his
attorney.
Reliance on police motive to define misconduct, however, raises
other problems. An intent to deprive a suspect of his right to counsel
is difficult, if not impossible, to prove. Moreover, the police activity
56. All though the New York rule is required by that state's constitution,
the Supreme Court, in its citation and discussion of the New York cases in
Massiah and Escobedo, see note 54 supra, has made clear that the underlying
rationale for the absolute right is applicable to an analysis of the sixth amend-
ment.
57. See discussion in United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110, 111-12 (10th Cir),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973); United States v. DeLoy, 421 F.2d 900, 902
(5th Cir. 1970). See also Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v.
United States & Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REV. 47, 57-58 (1964) (ulti-
mate issue in Massiah was the permissible extent of governmental deceit).
58. 551 F.2d at 644. The dissent in Brown agreed that attempts by the police
to isolate a suspect from his counsel are improper: "We cannot condone such
tactics as deliberately intercepting a 'known target' in a criminal investigation
walking through the halls of a state court en route to a conference with her
attorney to prepare for a preliminary hearing." Id. at 650.
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itself, not the motive prompting such conduct, infringes upon the
suspect's right to his lawyer's assistance. In condemning all govern-
mental contact that bypasses the suspect's attorney, the absolute right
method permits the court to avoid determining the subjective intent
of the police. Conclusively presuming an unconstitutional motive, this
approach suggests that the possibility of a legitimate police induce-
ment is so slight as to make unnecessary an individual judicial deter-
mination in each case.5 9
In 1973, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit adopted an
alternative justification to the constitutional basis for the absolute
right to counsel. In United States v. Thomas,60 the court invoked the
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, which prohibited the direct con-
tact by an attorney with an adversary, 1 to formulate a prospective
administrative rule that is similar to New York's absolute approach.6 2
The Tenth Circuit's rule prevents the admission into evidence of
statements made during questioning by a defendant whose previously-
retained attorney was neither notified of the interrogation nor given
a reasonable opportunity to be present.63 The only qualification
placed on this rule requires that a suspect have counsel prior to his
interrogation 4 In addition, because an ethical rule applicable to the
conduct of lawyers forms the basis for the decision, only the defend-
ant's attorney, and not the suspect himself, may waive the right.6 5 As
59. Although the possibility of an innocent direct contact remains, the re-
quirement of the absolute approach that police know or have reason to know of
the suspect's attorney-client relationship minimizes the potential harm of pre-
suming an unlawful intent. See note 55 supra & accompanying text.
60. 474 F.2d 110 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973).
61. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 9. The corresponding discipli-
nary rule to Canon No. 9 provides in pertinent part: "[A] lawyer shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate ... with a party he knows to
be represented by a lawyer . . . unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer
representing such another party .... " ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY DR 7-104.
62. 474 F.2d at 112. In Thomas the defendant had requested an interview with
a governmental agent and signed a "Miranda type waiver of rights form." Id.
at 111. Basing its decision on the ABA Canons, the court implied that if the
result had been required by the Constitution the defendant could have benefited
from the ruling. Id. at 112.
63. Id. The interrogator need not be a prosecuting attorney. The court con-
siders law enforcement officials to be agents of the prosecutor; therefore, a
suspect's communications to them also are inadmissible. Id. Similarly, DR 7-104
of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility expressly prohibits an attorney
from "causing another to communicate." See note 61 supra.
64. 474 F.2d at 112.
65. The court did not determine whether an attorney, through his negligence
or otherwise, could force a waiver of his client's right to counsel. For example,
[Vol. 19:141
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with the absolute approach that is based on constitutional considera-
tions, the Tenth Circuit's rule permits its courts to avoid issues
of police motive and therefore implicitly recognizes that the conduct
of the police in bypassing the suspect's attorney, not their intent,
damages the substance of the defendant's right to counsel.0 6
The Waivable Right Approach
Relying on the general principle that constitutional rights may
be waived,67 some courts implicitly reject the proposition that any
direct governmental contact with a suspect who has an attorney,
by itself, may violate the sixth amendment; instead, these courts place
the burden of exercising the Massiah right on the defendant.0 8 The
strongest support for this viewpoint derives from the Supreme
Court's decision in Brewer. Refusing to decide whether an accused
could ever relinquish his Massiah right, 9 the Court implicitly ap-
proved the waiver approach in Brewer by explaining why the detec-
tive had not obtained a renunciation from Williams.7"
Disagreement exists, however, as to the warning prerequisites
necessary to permit waiver of the sixth amendment guarantee. One
position, that taken by the dissenting judge in Brown, maintains that
Miranda warnings sufficiently apprise the accused of his right to
counsel.71 The Brown majority rejects this position in favor of a re-
quirement that the suspect be advised not only of his privileges under
Miranda but also of his specific right to the presence of his particular
attorney.72 The foundation for both positions rests on the waiver
because the rule requires that the police give a suspect's lawyer only a reason-
able opportunity to be present during any interrogation, see text accompanying
note 63 supra, a court might permit the introduction of evidence from questioning
that was conducted after the defendant's attorney failed to appear. If the purpose
of the rule is to protect the defendant, however, it should be construed as a
condemnation of direct police-suspect contact, rather than as a standard that a
lawyer may waive without the consent of his client.
66. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
67. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Comment, The Statute
of Limitations in a Criminal Case: Can it be Waived?, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV.
823, 835-36 (1977).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 551 F.2d 639 (5th Cir. 1977); Reinke v.
United States, 405 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1968); Coughlan v. United States, 391
F.2d 371 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 870 (1968).
69. 430 U.S. at 405-06.
70. Id. at 405. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
71. 551 F.2d at 648; accord, Reinke v. United States, 405 F.2d 228, 229 (9th
Cir. 1968); Coughlan v. United States, 391 F.2d 371, 371-72 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 870 (1968).
72. 551 F.2d at 643.
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standard enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst,7 3 in which the Supreme
Court determined that a valid renunciation of a constitutional guaran-
tee must be "an intentional relinquishment of a known right
or privilege." 74 Thus, the question is whether the Miranda warnings
sufficiently advise the suspect of his Massiah privilege, for if the
individual is unaware of the guarantee, he cannot relinquish it.
In determining that Brown had not been denied her right to
counsel,7 5 Judge Fay, the dissenter in Brown, focused on the accused's
knowledge of her sixth amendment privilege and concluded that the
defendant must have known she had an attorney.7 6 Reasoning thaf the
Miranda warnings unambiguously advised Brown of her right to the
presence of her attorney7 7 the judge argued that the defendant effec-
tively had waived her Massiah rjght.7 8 The dissent's position, how-
ever, relied on the case's peculiar facts, particularly the defendant's
college education; it assumed, without proof, that Brown possessed
knowledge' of her rights.7 9 Under Judge Fay's rationale, the Miranda
warnings could have been insufficient in a different factual situation,
and arguably, the required content of any police preinterrogation
notice would have depended upon the criminal suspect's level of
sophistication or intelligence.
Althodgh in Johnson the Supreme Court stated that the accused's
background and experience should be evaluated when determining the
effectiveness of a relinquishment of his constitutional rights,8 0 the
Court in Brewer refused to recognize an implied waiver by a defendant
who appeared to understand his Massiah right.8 1 Placing an affirma-
tive duty on the police to establish that the suspect understood and
intended to waive his right to counsel, the court refused to presume
that Williams, the defendant, knowingly surrendered his sixth amend-
ment guarantee merely because earlier he had been given his Miranda
warnings and appeared to understand his right to counsel.82 Before a
voluntary relinquishment of Williams's Massiah right could be found,
the Court implied that the defendant, an escaped mental patient,
would need to be advised specifically of his sixth amendment privi-
73. 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
74. Id.
75. 551 F.2d at 650 (dissenting opinion).
76. Id. at 648.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 650.
79. Id. at 648.
80. 304 U.S. at 464.
81. 430 U.S. at 404-06.
82. Id.
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lege.8 3 What should be included in an effective warning and whether
such a statement need be given to an individual possessing a greater
intellectual capacity than did Williams remained among the questions
unresolved by the court in Brewer.84
The majority in Brown addressed both of these issues and deter-
mined that the sixth amendment rights enunciated in Massiah require
an accused to be given a warning in addition to those necessitated by
Miranda.15 Moreover, in according this protection to Brown, who was
well-educated, the court rejected any proposition that the police need
to offer an explanation of the privilege only to unsophisticated sus-
pects. These safeguards must be implemented before an individual
becomes capable of intelligently considering a waiver of his right to
consult with his attorney. 6
Brown correctly concludes that the FBI agents specifically should
have advised the defendant of her Massit right. Unlike the Miranda
requirements, which primarily are designed to protect a suspect's
constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination, ' the specific
warning acknowledges the independent importance of the sixth
amendment right to counsel 88 and the respect that an existing attor-
ney-client relationship requires. In addition, Brown. complements the
decisions of the Supreme Court in Massiah and Escobedo by establish-
ing guidelines for the implementation of the right recognized in those
cases. Thus, when an investigation has reached the accusatory stage
and the police have reason to know that a suspect previously has
83. Id. at 405. In his dissent in Brewer, Justice White stated that Massiah
provides an identical right to counsel as that involved in Miranda. Id. at 435 n.5
(White, J., dissenting). See note 7 supra & accompanying text. As a result, he
argued that "[tihere is absolutely no reason to require an additional question to
the already cumbersome Miranda litany .... " 430 U.S. at 435 n.5. Although not
explicitly disagreeing with Justice White, the majority in Brewer stated that the
Miranda doctrine was "designed to secure the constitutional privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination," Id. at 397, thereby implying that the Miranda
warnings may be insufficient to safeguard a suspect's sixth amendment rights
under Massiah. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
84. A third important question left unanswered in Brewer concerns the time
of the required warnings and whether the police must repeat them periodically.
A discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Comment.
85. 551 F.2d 643.
86. Id. at 643 & n.13.
87. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 397 (1977); notes 7, 83 supra
& accompanying text.
88. The importance of the right to counsel is discussed in Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963), and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-71
(1932). See also, e.g., Note, Dollars and Sense of an Expanded Right to Counsel,
55 IowA L. REV. 1249, 1250-51 (1970).
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retained an attorney, the "interrogating officers must make a reason-
able attempt to determine prior to the interrogation whether the
individual questioned has an attorney with whom she would like to
consult." 89 In contrast, the Miranda warnings must be given only
before a custodial interrogation.90 Because the accusatory stage may
be reached before a custodial interrogation occurs, 91 those jurisdic-
tions employing only the Miranda warnings will have to use those
statements more often than is required by the Supreme Court. In the
Fifth Circuit, however, the police must warn the suspect only of his
Massiah right during the accusatory stage, and this advice may be
treated as a codicil to the Miranda warnings when the interrogation
reaches a custodial context.
By requiring that an accused be advised specifically of his Massiah
right in addition to his Miranda privileges during a custodial interro-
gation, Brown comports with the Court's decision in Brewer. Such a
warning notifies the defendant that he may exercise not only his right
against self-incrimination but also his sixth amendment guarantee to
consult with his previously-retained lawyer.9 2 Once apprised of his
Massiah right, a suspect should possess sufficient knowledge to deter-
mine whether he will make a voluntary waiver that complies with the
requirements of Brewer 93 and Johnson9 4 Finally, Brown extends the
boundaries of Supreme Court precedent and creates a rule of admin-
istrative convenience for law enforcement officers. Although the Court
has not required that every suspect possessing an attorney be advised
specifically of his right to counsel, it has refused to approve either an
involuntary or an unintelligent waiver. 95 By requiring an explicit
Massiah warning, the Fifth Circuit rule will permit the police to avoid
litigating the issue of whether a waiver is effective simply because the
accused did not understand his sixth amendment guarantee.
89. 551 F.2d at 643.
90. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 344-48 (1976); notes 7, 34
supra & accompanying text.
91. The accusatory stage is reached whenever the purpose of the investigation
is to elicit a confession from the suspect. See note 25 supra & accompanying text.
In contrast, a custodial interrogation is not defined by the police purpose; instead,
it occurs when investigators have taken the suspect into actual custody or
otherwise significantly restrained his freedom. See, e.g., Orozco v. Texas, 394
U.S. 324, 326-27 (1969); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The
distinction between the accusatory stage and a custodial interrogation is unclear.
In Miranda the Court appeared to equate a custodial interrogation with "an
investigation which had focused on an accused." Id. at 444 & n.4.
92. See notes 83-84 supra & accompanying text.
93. See notes 81-83 supra & accompanying text.
94. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
95. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404-06 (1977).
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The Absolute Right and the Waivable Right Approaches:
A Comparative Analysis
In a comparison of the two methods of implementing an accused's
Massiah right, the waivable approach possesses several advantages
over the absolute procedure. For example, by preventing waivers, the
absolute approach provides suspects with protection apparently ex-
ceeding the reqnirements of the sixth amendment as construed by the
Court in Brewer.96 As a result, a jurisdiction requiring this procedure
should rely upon authority other than the Constitution.
Another difficulty with the absolute right approach stems from its
condemnation as police misconduct of all governmental contact by-
passing a suspect's attorney.9 In New York this blanket prohibition
has prompted the court of appeals to recognize an equally compre-
hensive exception to the rule. Thus, the court has recognized that the
right applies only to custodial interrogations 99 and has determined
that the initiation of contact by an accused removes an interrogation
from the custodial context. 10
United States v. DeLoy,l 10 a 1970 Fifth Circuit decision, demon-
strates conclusively that the police require some leeway in those cir-
cumstances when a suspect initiates the interrogation. Following his
indictment and the appointment of counsel, the defendant, DeLoy,
repeatedly and without invitation approached FBI agents and made
incriminating statements. 02 Before he presented the evidence, the
defendant was given his Miranda warnings and advised to contact his
attorney, a suggestion DeLoy maintained he had followed. In this
situation, which lacked even a hint of governmental impropriety, a
strict adherence to the absolute method would have served no purpose.
96. See text accompanying notes 69-70 supra.
97. Thus, the New York Constitution provided the basis for the absolute right
requirement in that state, see notes 53-54, 56 supra & accompanying text, and
the Tenth Circuit's authority for its rule was Canon No. 9 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics. See notes 60-62 supra & accompanying text.
98. See note 59 supra & accompanying text.
99. See 20 BUFFALO L. REV. 704, 707-08 (1971).
100. See, e.g., People v. Kaye, 25 N.Y.2d 139, 250 N.E.2d 329, 303 N.Y.S.2d
41 (1969) (spontaneous admissions to police after advice of rights by counsel
not the result of interrogation) ; People v. McKie, 25 N.Y.2d 19, 250 N.E.2d 36,
302 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1969) (incriminating statement made in street argument with
police not the result of interrogation) ; cf. People v. Robles, 27 N.Y.2d 155, 263
N.E.2d 304, 314 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1970) (incriminating statement made to detective
in conversation after defendant's attorney left the room not the result of interro-
gation).
101. 421 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1970).
102. DeLoy estimated that he made more than twenty unsolicited visits to
different FBI offices.
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In other, less extreme circumstances, however, in which the defen-
dant was less persistent than DeLoy in initiating contact with the
police, the wisdom of an absolute exception to the New York rule is
questionable. For example, in People v. McKie,10 3 the defendant made
incriminating assertions to the police during a street encounter he
initiated. McKie made the statements only after previous police
abuses of his right to counsel caused him to believe that law enforce-
ment officials were preparing once more to approach and question
him.1 04 Although the defendant's assumption was accurate, the New
York Court of Appeals upheld the admission of the incriminating
evidence because McKie initially had contacted the police. 0 5
That the defendant's right to counsel can depend on the identity of
the party initiating the interrogation is as troublesome as the abso-
lute right's presumption that all police activity circumventing a sus-
pect's lawyer constitutes misconduct. The individual most likely to
approach the police is the suspect who probably does not understand
his constitutional privilege and who is incapable of making an intelli-
gent waiver of his sixth amendment guarantee. By excluding this
person from coverage, the exception to the absolute approach may
deny the suspect his Massiah right.
In contrast, the waivable right approach eliminates much of the
potential for police misconduct by requiring the interrogator to advise
the suspect of his Massiah right, regardless of which party initiates
the conversation. Under this procedure, the defendant in DeLoy, hav-
ing been advised of his right to counsel, would have made a valid
waiver. In McKie, on the other hand, in which the accused received
no warnings prior to his incriminating statements, a court applying
the waivable right approach would not have permitted law enforce-
ment officials to capitalize on the suspect's ignorance of his constitu-
tional privilege. Instead, the court would have upheld a waiver by
McKie only after the police had advised the defendant of his right to
consult with his attorney.
The waivable procedure holds a final advantage over the absolute
approach in the degree to which each method comports with the
Supreme Court's philosophy in Miranda. In announcing a police pro-
cedure designed to protect an accused's right against self-incrimina-
tion, the Court in Miranda did not intend to eliminate all direct police-
suspect contact; rather, it attempted to prevent interrogative tactics
103. 25 N.Y.2d 19, 250 N.E.2d 36, 302 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1969).
104. McKie's attorney on numerous occasions had asked the detectives, who
repeatedly had approached McKie, to refrain from speaking to the defendant.
105. 25 N.Y.2d at 28, 250 N.E.2d at 41, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 540-41.
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designed to exploit a suspect's ignorance of his constitutional rights.10 6
After the investigator advises a suspect of his fifth amendment privi-
lege, Miranda permits the accused to make a voluntary waiver of that
right.'0 7 The waivable approach to implementing the Massia right
comports with the Miranda requirements; in contrast, the absolute
mehtod, by preventing waiver, is subject to criticism for placing an
undue restriction on police investigations. 0
This analysis demonstrates that the waivable right approach is the
correct procedure for implementing the Massiah right to counsel.
Unlike the absolute approach, the waivable method provides a suspect
with protection that is coextensive with the constitutional privilege;
it neither overinsulates some defendants from police questioning nor
underprotects others merely because they initially contact their inter-
rogators. Moreover, the waivable approach conforms to the philosophy
of Miranda and creates no unreasonable obstruction of law enforce-
ment officials' investigations.
CONCLUSION
Normally, police guidelines implementing state and federal consti-
tutional rights should be established not by judicial pronouncements
of specific procedural requirements, but through legislature enact-
ments. In United States v. Brown, however, the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit successfully interpreted several complex Supreme
Court opinions involving extremely disparate factual situations and
-announced a simple method through which law enforcement officials
could refrain from infringing upon a suspect's sixth amendment right
to consult with his previously-retained attorney. Of the various judi-
cial approaches adopted to date, the procedure announced in Brown
most closely comprehends the scope of the constitutional guarantee.
For this reason, the decision in Brown, which has been granted a
rehearing en bane, should be left undisturbed so that it may serve as
a model for the other circuits.
106. 384 U.S. at 479-91. In Miranda the Court discussed at length the various
means through which the police abuse their power. Id. at 445-58.
107. Id. at 475. See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
108. In his dissent in Brewer, Chief Justice Burger articulated another possible
objection to an absolute approach:
The Court's holding operates to "imprison a man in his privi-
leges," . . . it conclusively presumes a suspect is legally incompe-
tent to change his mind and tell the truth until an attorney is
present. It denigrates an individual to a nonperson whose free will
has become hostage to a lawyer .... It denies that the rights to
counsel and silence are personal, nondelegable, and subject to
waiver only by that individual.
430 U.S. at 419 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citation and footnote omitted).
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